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Abstract
The effect of immigration on preferences for redistribution has been recently 
studied in the context of developed countries receiving migrants from poorer coun- 
tries with very different cultural backgrounds. In this paper we explore this issue in 
the context of migration across similar Latin American countries. To this aim, we 
exploit data at the provincial level from a large attitudinal survey (LAPOP) and 
match it to immigration data from different sources. We follow three approaches: 
first, we implement an instrumental variables approach in a cross-section of cen- 
suses; second we estimate fixed effects models with data from a large sample of 
harmonized national household surveys, and third we exploit the massive inflow of 
Venezuelan refugees into the border country of Colombia with an instrumental vari­
ables methodology. Our results suggest a significant, negative and non-monotonic 
relationship between the share of immigrants at the provincial level and the sup- 
port for redistribution policies. This anti-redistribution effect is larger among those 
individuals with higher income.
JEL Classification: D63, O15, N36.
Keywords: Migration, Inequality, Redistribution, Latin America
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1 Introduction
Preferences for redistribution are key determinants of the type and size of public policies and 
ultimately of the level of inequality in a country. Researchers in Economics and other fields are 
trying to understand the factors that shape these social preferences. A recent strand of this 
literature has studied the potential negative effect of immigration on the support for redistri­
bution (Alesina, Murard, and Rapoport, 2019; Dahlberg, Edmark, and Lundqvist, 2012; Razin, 
Sadka, and Swagel, 2002; Tabellini, 2018, 2019). So far, the studies have focused on the case of 
developed countries receiving migrants from poorer countries with very different cultural back- 
grounds. Instead, in this paper we explore this issue in a different context: migrations across 
Latin American countries. The context is different at least for two relevant reasons. First, we 
focus on migration across countries that are economically and culturally much more homoge- 
neous than those analyzed in the previous literature. Second, we study this phenomenon in one 
of the two most unequal regions in the world (the other is sub-Saharan Africa) with levels of in­
come inequality much higher than those in the developed countries analyzed in previous papers 
(Alvaredo and Gasparini, 2015). We believe this is the first paper that extends the analysis of 
immigration and social preferences to this context.
The issue is also relevant considering the recent reduction in the support to redistribution 
policies in Latin America. Although the evidence suggests that redistributive policies played 
a significant role in reducing income inequality in the 2000s, and although inequality is still 
very high, the support for redistribution seems to have fallen in the 2010s. In fact, since 2010, 
the percentage of individuals that show significant support for strong policies to reduce income 
inequality decreased more than 28% (Figure A1 in Appendix A). At the same time, immigration 
has increased substantially; in particular migration across Latin American countries. Today 
intra-regional immigrants represent 70% of total migration in Latin America.
In this paper we empirically analyze the relationship between immigration and preferences 
for redistribution in Latin America.1 To this aim, we exploit data at the provincial level from 
a large attitudinal survey -the biannual 2008-2018 Latin American Public Opinion Project 
(LAPOP) survey- and match it to immigration data from different sources.2
1 Alesina and Stantcheva (2020) provide a novel conceptual framework to think the relationship 
between support for redistributive policies and immigration where (mis)perceptions and bias per se 
against immigrants play a crucial role.
2 Hereafter, we refer to states, departments or provinces of the different countries -depending on 
countries' political division- simply as provinces.
We use three different research strategies. First, we build a novel dataset of immigration 
shares at the province level from harmonized census data (IPUMS International) matched to 
LAPOP data. This allows us to conduct a cross-sectional analysis with 12 countries and 222 
provinces. In order to address the potential endogeneity of migrants' location decision, we follow 
an instrumental variables approach similar to Card (2001) by considering the past geographical 
distribution of immigrants by country of origin. Our results suggest a negative relationship 
between the province share of immigrants and preferences for redistribution of the resident 
population. Detailed demographic and socio-economic information in census and LAPOP data 
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allow us to look for heterogeneous responses to immigration both from the respondent and the 
immigration sides. We find that the anti-redistribution effect of immigration is larger for both 
high-income and high-skilled respondents and in receiving countries with higher public spending. 
We also find that the negative effect is, indeed, mainly driven by immigrants coming from other 
Latin American countries.
As a second strategy we estimate a fixed-effects model with microdata from a large sample 
of harmonized national household surveys (SEDLAC) over time. Despite its limitations this 
strategy provides some useful information on the short-run association between immigration 
and social preferences. In particular, estimates of the two-way fixed effects model show again a 
negative anti-redistribution effect of local exposure to immigrants.
Finally, in a third approach, we exploit a recent case of massive intra-regional immigration 
in Latin America: the Venezuelan exodus to Colombia. We use an instrumental variables 
strategy for the share of Venezuelan immigration relative to departmental population based on 
the distance between Venezuelan and Colombian departments. This enclave instrument has been 
typically used in previous work analyzing episodes of forced migration, including the Venezuelan 
case (Del Carpio and Wagner, 2015; Morales, 2018; Caruso, Canon, and Mueller, 2019). We find 
that Venezuelan immigration into Colombia significantly lowers the support for redistribution. 
The effect is greater compared to the effect found on average for Latin America with the other 
two alternative approaches.
This paper is most closely related to a growing body of literature for the United States 
and Europe showing that immigration reduces population support for redistributive policies 
and government tax revenues and spending (Alesina, Murard, and Rapoport, 2019; Dahlberg, 
Edmark, and Lundqvist, 2012; Razin, Sadka, and Swagel, 2002; Tabellini, 2018, 2019). Specifi- 
cally, Alesina, Murard, and Rapoport (2019) find that immigration exposure in Europe regions 
lowers natives' preferences for redistribution with a stronger effect when immigrants are from 
Middle-Eastern and Eastern European countries.
We contribute to this strand of literature by trying to answer the research question about 
immigration and support for redistribution in a very different context. Contrary to that existing 
literature -which has focused on immigration coming from developing to developed countries-, 
we analyze a case characterized essentially by intra-regional migratory flows in one of the most 
unequal regions in the world (Alvaredo and Gasparini, 2015). This means that immigration 
comes from countries with relatively similar cultural backgrounds in terms of language, political 
and economic history. Both high inequality and not-too culturally distant immigrants can at- 
tenuate the potential negative effect of immigration on individual preferences for redistribution.
However, we find that there is still a large negative effect of immigration on the support 
for redistribution. Indeed, we obtain coefficients that are similar in magnitude to those found 
by Alesina, Murard, and Rapoport (2019). To the best of our knowledge, there is no evidence 
on this relationship in developing countries. We go a step further and contribute by studying a 
particular case of border countries: the Venezuelan massive exodus to Colombia. In this case of 
mass immigration in a very short period of time we find a substantially higher anti-redistribution 
effect.
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This paper is also related to the literature studying the effects of immigration on the emer- 
gence of far-right political candidates (Barone, D'Ignazio, de Blasio, and Naticchioni, 2016; 
Becker, Fetzer, et al., 2016; Brunner and Kuhn, 2018; Edo, Giesing, Oztunc, and Poutvaara, 
2019; Dinas, Matakos, Xefteris, and Hangartner, 2019; Dustmann, Vasiljeva, and Piil Damm, 
2019; Halla, Wagner, and Zweimuller, 2017; Harmon, 2018; Otto and Steinhardt, 2014; Stein- 
mayr, 2020). In the case of Colombia, Rozo and Vargas (2019) show that Venezuelan migration 
flows shift votes to right-wing political parties. Our results shed some light on the mechanism 
underlying the electoral impacts found in the literature: an increase in immigration reduces 
preferences for redistributive policies among voters and, through this channel, may increase 
chances of extreme right-wing candidates to winning elections.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we briefly describe the main data 
sources and comment on the patterns of immigration and redistribution preferences in Latin 
America. The following three sections present the methodology, the data and the results of 
three different strategies: an instrumental variable analysis based on cross-country census data 
(Section 3); a fixed-effect model based on a panel of microdata from national household surveys 
(Section 4); and an analysis of the massive forced migration of Venezuelans in Colombia (Section 
5). Section 6 ends with some concluding remarks.
2 Immigration and Support for Redistribution in Latin 
America
There has been a noticeable change in the nature of immigration in Latin America. Over the 
last decades, immigration has increasingly become an intra-regional phenomenon, i.e. countries 
receiving migrants from other Latin American countries. On average, intra-regional immigration 
went from representing 55% of total immigration in the 1990s to almost 70% in the 2010s (Figure 
1).3
3 The average total percentage of immigrants went from 2.2% to 2.9% in the same period which 
highlights the compositional change.
This process was particularly strong in Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Peru and Uruguay. 
Intra-regional migrations were exacerbated in the last years by social and economic crises in 
countries such as Honduras, Haiti and Venezuela. The fact that, in contrast to Europe and 
the United States, immigration in Latin America is mostly intra-regional may imply a different 
relationship between immigration and support for redistribution.
3
Figure 1: Intra-regional immigration in Latin America
Notes. Source: Own elaboration based on census data. See Table B4 for details on data sources and 
years considered.
2.1 Data
In order to analyze the support for redistribution policies we use the Latin American Public 
Opinion Project (LAPOP) surveys for the 2008-2018 period. The survey is available every 
two years and is representative at the national level. It contains socioeconomic and attitudinal 
information at the individual level for almost all the countries in the region. We focus on 
individuals between 18 and 65 years old.
In order to measure preferences for redistribution we use a question that captures the degree 
of agreement with the State intervention to reduce income inequality. More specifically, respon- 
dents answer on a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 indicates “Strongly disagree” and 7 “Strongly agree”, 
the following question: “The (Country) government should implement firm policies to reduce 
income inequality between the rich and the poor. To what extent do you agree or disagree with 
this statement?”. Appendix B provides some descriptive statistics of the individuals sampled in 
LAPOP.4
4 One limitation of our paper is that we can not distinguish immigrants and natives in LAPOP 
respondents. However according to our calculations, Latinobarometer, a similar survey with information 
on country of birth shows that in 2018 immigrants represent a very small share of respondents (on 
average 1.27%) that could rarely be driving the results.
Regarding immigration data, we use census data from IPUMS International in order to build 
a novel database with the share of immigrants in the population at the province level for 12 Latin 
American countries. We use the latest available census for each country which corresponds to 
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the 2010s.5 Immigrant status is defined by individual's birthplace (i.e. being born in a foreign 
country).
5 For some recent census in which IPUMS data are not available, we use the raw census information 
from official websites. To obtain immigrants in the past for constructing the instrument we also rely on 
IPUMS data. See Table in Appendix B for details on data sources.
6 We restricted the sample to the provinces that appear on all waves of the LAPOP survey to work 
with a balanced panel of provinces over time. Due to data availability, there are some exceptions on 
the LAPOP-household surveys years matches (See Table B5 Appendix B for details on countries and 
years availability). In addition, one drawback of this source of information is that immigration data 
are noisier than with census data. However, in Appendix B, Figure B1 shows that there is a strong 
correlation between both sources of information for a sample of countries. The coefficient of a regression 
of both variables with country fixed effects is 0.87. This suggests that household surveys reflect the 
actual share of immigrants.
We then merge attitudinal and immigration data. Since LAPOP data contains precise 
information about respondents' residence, we merge individual level data with immigration 
shares at the province level. More specifically, we pool 2008-2018 LAPOP surveys and matched 
them with the most recent available census. The final sample consists of 85,088 individuals for 
12 countries and 222 provinces.
As an alternative to census data, we use information drawn from the national household sur- 
veys. In particular, we use the Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(SEDLAC) in order to build a unique and harmonized database of immigrants' shares at the 
province level for most Latin American countries over time (not-only-census years). SEDLAC is 
built by CEDLAS and the World Bank by carrying out a process of harmonization of national 
household surveys and, therefore, making them comparable across countries. These repeated 
measures of immigration allow us to estimate a fixed-effects model. In this case, the merge is 
more straightforward: we merge each LAPOP wave with the immigration shares at the province 
level from household surveys for the corresponding year. These data allow us to analyze 11 
countries and 193 provinces in Latin America.6
Finally, we also rely on household surveys from SEDLAC to construct socio-demographic 
variables at the province level. From this source we obtain total population, unemployment 
rate, average household per capita income and the Gini Coefficient.
3 Cross-sectional analysis
3.1 Empirical strategy
To analyze the relationship between immigration and support for redistribution our first ap- 
proach is to estimate the following regression model:
Ripct = a + ft1Mpc + @2Mpc + Xipct® + Zpci$ + ^ct + eipct (1)
where Ripct is individual's i support for reduction in income differences in province p country 
c and LAPOP wave t; Mpc is the immigration share in province p at country c measured at 
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the latest available census year as described in the Data section; Xipct is a vector of individual 
controls (years of education, age, sex, race, marital status, employment activity status, urban 
status, income scales, subjective income mobility and a self-reported variable for an insecurity 
episode) and Zpct a vector of provincial controls (log of native population, unemployment rate, 
mean of household per capita income and Gini coefficient); Ací are country-year fixed effects. 
Standard errors are clustered at the province-year level to account for possible correlation within 
this level.
This specification exploits variation of immigrants within a country-year. To put it simply, 
in a specific country-year, it compares support for redistribution policies between provinces with 
a relatively high share of immigrants to those with a relatively low share.
We follow a quadratic specification for the share of immigrants to capture the non-linearity 
in the relationship between the number of immigrants and attitudes. Alesina, Murard, and 
Rapoport (2019) shows that this specification fits the data well. Intuitively, it allows the share 
of immigrants to affect preferences negatively but with a marginally decreasing rate. It is 
based on the idea that societies may end up assimilating immigrants and is consistent with the 
discussion of contact versus exposure (Steinmayr, 2020). According to social psychology, groups 
with higher levels of contact (in our case natives and immigrants), are more likely to reduce 
prejudice towards the other group. Therefore, when the share of immigrants is above a certain 
level, contact between natives and immigrants will be more frequent and therefore prejudice and 
rejection against immigrants can be reduced (For an extensive review of the intergroup contact 
theory see, for instance, Pettigrew, Tropp, Wagner, and Oliver, 2011).
The migration literature has long discussed the potential endogeneity of migrants' location 
choice (see, for instance, Altonji and Card, 1991; Sasin and McKenzie, 2007). In our case, 
the main concern is that unobserved factors may affect both immigration and preferences for 
redistribution. For example, if migrants flow to destinations with more generous welfare systems 
(the so-called “welfare magnets”), which may be the result of population's preferences, we can 
expect a positive bias (Borjas, 1999). This specific endogeneity concern implies a lower bound 
for our estimates.
On the other hand, province's economic growth and upward mobility perspectives may 
be influencing immigrant's location decisions. We include some provincial controls such as 
unemployment rate, mean of household per capita income and the Gini coefficient to try to 
mitigate this concern. We also exclude capital cities as a robustness check.
However, other unobservables may still bias our results. To alleviate the endogeneity prob- 
lem, we instrument the share of immigrants Mpc with the standard shift-share instrument (Card, 
2001). The main idea is to predict the share of immigrants in a specific province-country using 
the country's geographical distribution of immigrants from each nationality in the past and the 
total number of immigrants of the same nationality in the country in the present. The equation 
for the instrument is the following:
Mípc = zopcmoc
o
(2)
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where moc is the total number of immigrants from country origin o living in country c; 
zopc is the share of past immigrants from country of origin o living in province p. Finally, Ppc 
is the predicted population of province p in country c considering the distribution of native 
individuals in the country in the past and the predicted number of immigrants in each province. 
Table B4 describes the years for present and past immigrants for each country. For the squared 
share of immigrants we use the squared instrument. Overall, the identifying assumption is that 
unobservables that determined the past location of immigrants are not correlated with current 
local preferences for redistribution besides the relation they have through present immigrants.
Figure 2 shows there is a strong relationship between the actual share of immigrants and the 
predicted share based on the equation 2, which supports the relevance condition of the proposed 
instrument.
Figure 2: First Stage Correlation
Notes: The figure shows the binscatter derived from a regression of the share of immigrants from census 
data to the predicted share of immigrants according to equation 2. The sample includes countries 
described in Table B4.
3.2 Main Results
Table 1 shows the estimates of equation (1) for support for redistribution by OLS and IV. 
Columns of each estimate add controls sequentially: country-year fixed effects, provincial con- 
trols and individual controls. Across all specifications, we find that, on average, there is a 
negative association between the province's share of immigrants and support for redistribution. 
More specifically, for the OLS estimation with the full set of controls we find that for an average 
province in our sample (a province with a share of immigrants close to 1.8%), a 1 percentage 
point (pp) increase in the immigrants' share reduces support for redistribution policies by more 
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than 0.03 standard deviations.
The implementation of the IV approach yields even stronger results. In column (VI) of 
Table 1 we find that a 1 pp increase in the percentage of immigrants, for an average province 
in terms of migration in our sample, reduces preferences for redistribution by more than 0.05 
standard deviation. To put it differently, a one standard deviation increase in the share of 
immigrants (0.03) lowers support for redistribution policies by more than 17.7% of the standard 
deviations of preferences. This effect appears to be slightly greater than the one reported by 
Alesina, Murard, and Rapoport (2019) for Europe, where an increase in 1 standard deviation of 
the share immigrants reduces preferences for redistribution by about 12.3% standard deviations.
If we consider the non-linearity of the estimated effect, we can see that the share of immi­
grants in which the negative effect reaches its minimum and becomes positive is slightly higher 
than 0.06, which is close to the p90 of the distribution of immigration in our sample.7 On 
the other hand, the fact that IV estimates are larger than OLS ones may be suggesting that 
migrants sorting to welfare magnets may be the main endogeneity problem. This is not a novel 
result: Edo, Giesing, Oztunc, and Poutvaara (2019), for example, when studying immigration 
effect on political electoral votes also find higher estimates relative to OLS with a similar IV.
7 In our sample only 8% of the provinces have an immigration share above 0.06: 3 from Argentina, 
3 from Chile, 5 from Costa Rica, 4 from the Dominican Republic and 1 from Panama.
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OLS IV
Table 1: Effect of immigration on Preferences for Redistribution
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Share immigrants -4.220*** -4.220** -4.153** -6.883*** -7.091** -7.803**
(1.536) (1.791) (1.720) (2.561) (3.283) (3.297)
Share immigrants, squared 30.64*** 30.67** 29.79** 56.44** 58.44** 63.38**
(11.08) (12.60) (12.16) (23.12) (28.82) (29.02)
Observations 85,088 85,088 85,088 85,088 85,088 85,088
F-stat (Kleibergen-Paap Wald) 13.25 11.37 11.32
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Provincial controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Individual controls No No Yes No No Yes
8 In this subsection, when analyzing heterogeneous effects we estimate equation (1) including an 
interaction between the immigrants' share and the heterogeneity variable considered. We also include 
the heterogeneity variable as a control. For IV estimates, we instrument this interaction with the 
interaction of the predicted immigrants' share and the variable capturing the heterogeneity. First 
stages of IV estimates are presented in Tables C5, C6, C7 and C8. In addition, when we analyze the 
heterogeneous effect by the type of immigration we include the immigrants share and its quadratic form 
for each of these types. In this case, for the IV estimates we construct an instrument for each group 
separately following equation (2).
*** Significance at 1% level; ** significance at 5% level; *significance at 10% level.
Notes: Dependent variable measures support for reduction in income differences and is based on the agreement to the 
statement: “The (Country) government should implement strong policies to reduce income inequality between the rich and 
the poor”. It is standardized (z-score). Provincial controls include log native population, whether the city is small, medium 
or large, unemployment rate, mean of household per capita income and Gini coefficient; individual controls include years 
of education, age, sex, agexsex, years of educationxsex, marital status, self-reported race, rural respondent, activity status 
(employee, unemployed, student, retired), a dummy whether the individual lived an insecurity episode in the last 12 months, 
income scale and a subjective income mobility scale respect to the last 12 months. Clustered standard errors at the the 
province-year level in parenthesis.
3.3 Heterogeneous Effects
For a better understanding of the mechanisms behind this negative relationship, we explore 
some heterogeneous effects regarding respondents' characteristics and type of immigration.8
In the first place, respondent's income level can be an important determinant of the im- 
migration anti-redistribution effect. Indeed, in Table 2 we find that the effect of immigration 
on preferences for redistribution is stronger among individuals at the top of the income dis- 
tribution. This result could be explained by the fact that rich individuals may perceive that 
immigrants would imply a bigger welfare spending that they, as taxpayers, should finance. As 
Alesina and Stantcheva (2020) remark, native individuals may perceive, correctly or incorrectly, 
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that immigrants are net-recipients of public spending, even “free loaders”. These perceptions 
can affect the level of “acceptable” inequality for native individuals making them less prone to 
support reduction of income inequality when immigration is higher. This effect can be stronger 
among richer people.
OLS IV
Table 2: Heterogeneous Effects: Income level
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Share immigrants -3.984** -3.392* -3.428* -6.757*** -6.565** -6.888**
(1.584) (1.769) (1.762) (2.558) (3.237) (3.240)
Share immigrants x High-Income -0.653* -0.590* -0.661* -0.751** -0.705* -0.782**
(0.356) (0.356) (0.350) (0.379) (0.382) (0.374)
Share immigrants, squared 33.83*** 29.33** 30.06** 61.78*** 60.48** 63.10**
(11.14) (12.28) (12.16) (23.52) (29.01) (28.94)
Effect on High-Income -4.6369 -3.9817 -4.0892 -7.508 -7.270 -7.670
P-Value [0.0027]*** [0.0218]** [0.0176]** [0.00385]*** [0.0271]** [0.0196]**
Observations 85,088 85,088 85,088 85,088 85,088 85,088
F-stat (Kleibergen-Paap Wald) 8.876 7.566 7.583
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Provincial controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Individual controls No No Yes No No Yes
*** Significance at 1% level; ** significance at 5% level; *significance at 10% level.
Notes: Dependent variable measures support for reduction in income differences and is based on the agreement to the statement: “The 
(Country) government should implement strong policies to reduce income inequality between the rich and the poor”. It is standardized (z- 
score). Provincial controls include log native population, whether the city is small, medium or large, unemployment rate, mean of household 
per capita income and Gini coefficient; individual controls include years of education, age, sex, agexsex, years of educationxsex, marital 
status, self-reported race, rural respondent, activity status (employee, unemployed, student, retired), a dummy whether the individual lived 
an insecurity episode in the last 12 months, income scale and a subjective income mobility scale respect to the last 12 months. High-income 
individuals are defined as those with an income level in the 10th decile of the income distribution. Clustered standard errors at the the 
province-year level in parenthesis.
In Table 3 we examine the heterogeneity regarding respondent's skill level. We find evidence 
that relative to low-skilled individuals, more educated ones reduce more their support to redis- 
tribution in reaction to immigrants. This result goes against the one found by Alesina, Murard, 
and Rapoport (2019) in which tertiary-educated individuals show more educated preferences 
and suggests that in Latin America high-skilled may not be as tolerant towards minorities as 
they are in Europe. On the other hand, it could also be possible that higher-skilled individuals 
consider migrant labor as complementary to their labor. In this case, they may perceive that it 
is less likely for them to need government assistance and lower their support for redistribution.
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OLS IV
Table 3: Heterogeneous Effects: Skill level
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Share immigrants -4.124*** -3.540** -3.853** -6.938*** -6.802** -7.426**
(1.507) (1.706) (1.694) (2.547) (3.263) (3.276)
Share immigrants x High-Skilled -0.634** -0.623** -0.520* -0.704** -0.707** -0.577*
(0.289) (0.289) (0.281) (0.309) (0.310) (0.303)
Share immigrants, squared 32.37*** 28.34** 29.95** 60.11*** 59.63** 63.11**
(11.08) (12.24) (12.16) (23.16) (28.73) (28.87)
Effect on High-Skilled -4.7575 -4.1626 -4.3736 -7.642 -7.509 -8.003
P-Value [0.0024]*** [0.0180]** [0.0123]** [0.00312]*** [0.0225]** [0.0153]**
Observations 85,088 85,088 85,088 85,088 85,088 85,088
F-stat (Kleibergen-Paap Wald) 8.931 7.606 7.617
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Provincial controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Individual controls No No Yes No No Yes
*** Significance at 1% level; ** significance at 5% level; *significance at 10% level.
Notes: Dependent variable measures support for reduction in income differences and is based on the agreement to the statement: “The 
(Country) government should implement strong policies to reduce income inequality between the rich and the poor”. It is standardized (z- 
score). Provincial controls include log native population, whether the city is small, medium or large, unemployment rate, mean of household 
per capita income and Gini coefficient; individual controls include years of education, age, sex, agexsex, years of educationxsex, marital 
status, self-reported race, rural respondent, activity status (employee, unemployed, student, retired), a dummy whether the individual lived 
an insecurity episode in the last 12 months, income scale and a subjective income mobility scale respect to the last 12 months. High-skilled 
individuals are defined as those with more than completed secondary education. Clustered standard errors at the the province-year level 
in parenthesis.
We also analyze whether the anti-redistribution effect depends on the respondent's ideolog- 
ical position. Table 4 shows that the effect of immigration on preferences for redistribution is 
slightly stronger for those individuals who declares themselves as Non-Leftist. However, differ- 
ences are not statistically significant.
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Table 4: Heterogeneous Effects: Ideology
OLS IV
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Share immigrants -4.153** -3.858* -4.141** -7.162** -7.543** -8.364**
(1.749) (1.975) (1.950) (2.840) (3.698) (3.707)
Share immigrants x Non-Leftist -0.368 -0.355 -0.366 -0.129 -0.104 -0.0794
(0.558) (0.557) (0.543) (0.632) (0.632) (0.619)
Share immigrants, squared 32.84*** 30.31** 32.16** 60.02** 62.87** 68.43**
(11.36) (12.94) (12.81) (24.27) (31.25) (31.40)
Effect on Non-Leftist -4.5212 -4.2121 -4.5062 -7.291 -7.647 -8.444
P-Value [0.0052]*** [0.0241]** [0.0147]** [0.00720]*** [0.0329]** [0.0189]**
Observations 73,748 73,748 73,748 73,748 73,748 73,748
F-stat (Kleibergen-Paap Wald) 9.026 7.445 7.453
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Provincial controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Individual controls No No Yes No No Yes
*** Significance at 1% level; ** significance at 5% level; *significance at 10% level.
Notes: Dependent variable measures support for reduction in income differences and is based on the agreement to the statement: “The 
(Country) government should implement strong policies to reduce income inequality between the rich and the poor”. It is standardized (z- 
score). Provincial controls include log native population, whether the city is small, medium or large, unemployment rate, mean of household 
per capita income and Gini coefficient; individual controls include years of education, age, sex, agexsex, years of educationxsex, marital 
status, self-reported race, rural respondent, activity status (employee, unemployed, student, retired), a dummy whether the individual 
lived an insecurity episode in the last 12 months, income scale and a subjective income mobility scale respect to the last 12 months. 
Non-Leftists are defined as those with self-declared values of 4-10 in a ten-point ideology scale. Clustered standard errors at the the 
province-year level in parenthesis.
In Table 5 we further explore whether the effect varies according the immigrants' origin. 
We find that the anti-redistribution effect is mainly driven by immigrants coming from other 
Latin American countries.9 This is an important result for various reasons. In the first place, 
immigration has come from Latin America in the past decades, reinforced by some crisis. It 
is expected that intra-regional migration would continue. Furthermore, the relevance of intra- 
regional migration in Latin America is different from the cases of Europe and the US that have 
been discussed in the literature. Because of the relatively similar backgrounds and cultural 
norms between countries in Latin America we could have expected that individuals do not 
change much their preferences for redistribution as a result of immigration. However, what we 
find is that in fact the anti-redistribution effect comes mainly from this type of immigration.
9 According to our sample, 70% of immigrants are from other Latin American countries, about 12.7% 
are from Europe, 12.3% from other non-Latin American countries in the Americas, 4.5% from Asia and 
the rest from Africa and Oceania.
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Table 5: Heterogeneous Effects: Immigrants' origin
*** Significance at 1% level; ** significance at 5% level; *significance at 10% level.
Notes: Dependent variable measures support for reduction in income differences and is based on the agreement to the statement: 
“The (Country) government should implement strong policies to reduce income inequality between the rich and the poor”. 
It is standardized (z-score). Provincial controls include log native population, whether the city is small, medium or large, 
unemployment rate, mean of household per capita income and Gini coefficient; individual controls include years of education, age, 
sex, agexsex, years of education x sex, marital status, self-reported race, rural respondent, activity status (employee, unemployed, 
student, retired), a dummmy whether the individual lived an insecurity episode in the last 12 months, income scale and a subjective 
income mobility scale respect to the last 12 months. Clustered standard errors at the the province-year level in parenthesis.
OLS IV
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Share immigrants (LAC) -4.492** -4.032** -4.327** -7.016** -6.784** -7.566**
(1.894) (1.915) (1.899) (2.832) (3.197) (3.230)
Share immigrants (no LAC) -2.106 -2.540 -2.290 -0.684 -4.906 -4.524
(4.193) (5.262) (5.183) (5.633) (7.468) (7.378)
Share immigrants (LAC), squared 38.01** 34.33** 36.20** 66.03** 65.32** 71.22**
(16.96) (17.26) (17.09) (27.93) (32.17) (32.56)
Share immigrants (no LAC), squared 61.54 69.45 66.17 -28.26 99.91 92.71
(145.3) (157.7) (154.8) (188.8) (219.3) (213.9)
Observations 85,088 85,088 85,088 85,088 85,088 85,088
F-stat (Kleibergen-Paap Wald) 6.192 5.529 5.538
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Provincial controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Individual controls No No Yes No No Yes
Finally, we study heterogeneous effects by destination countries. In particular, in Table 6 we 
find that the effect of immigration on the support for redistribution is stronger in those countries 
with a higher average per capita social public spending. This result can be explained by the 
fact that countries with a higher welfare state are countries where the tax burden on taxpayers 
is greater and therefore, migrants perceived as net-beneficiaries of this public aid lower native 
preferences for redistribution.
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Table 6: Heterogeneous Effects: Destination countries
*** Significance at 1% level; ** significance at 5% level; *significance at 10% level.
Notes: Dependent variable measures support for reduction in income differences and is based on the agreement to the statement: “The (Country) 
government should implement strong policies to reduce income inequality between the rich and the poor”. It is standardized (z-score). Provincial 
controls include log native population, whether the city is small, medium or large, unemployment rate, mean of household per capita income and 
Gini coefficient; individual controls include years of education, age, sex, age x sex, years of education x sex, marital status, self-reported race, rural 
respondent, activity status (employee, unemployed, student, retired), a dummy whether the individual lived an insecurity episode in the last 12 
months, income scale and a subjective income mobility scale respect to the last 12 months. Clustered standard errors at the the provincial level in 
parenthesis. High-Social-Spending countries are the six countries with higher average public social spending per capita in ppp dollars based on data 
from CEPALSTAT for the period 2008-2018 (Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico, Panama and Uruguay). Clustered standard errors at the the 
province-year level in parenthesis.
OLS IV
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Share immigrants -3.467*** -3.324** -3.508** -1.699 -1.856 -2.640
(1.283) (1.480) (1.464) (1.989) (2.317) (2.323)
Share immigrants x High Social Spending -1.318 -1.112 -1.282 -4.412*** -4.374** -4.306**
(1.161) (1.205) (1.193) (1.615) (1.775) (1.757)
Share immigrants, squared 34.04*** 31.51** 33.72** 39.68** 41.19* 46.31**
(12.74) (14.37) (14.23) (18.71) (22.92) (22.78)
Effect on High Social Spending Country -4.7850 -4.4354 -4.7897 -6.111 -6.230 -6.946
P-Value [0.0100]** [0.0366]** [0.0226]** [0.00801]*** [0.0315]** [0.0158]**
Observations 85,088 85,088 85,088 85,088 85,088 85,088
F-stat (Kleibergen-Paap Wald) 14.80 14.34 14.63
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Provincial controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Individual controls No No Yes No No Yes
3.4 Robustness checks
To rule out the possibility that the results are driven by capital cities, we exclude them from the 
sample in Table C1. Results remain unchanged after this restriction. In addition, we include an 
ideology control in Table C3 and we find no differences on estimates of the effect of immigration 
on preferences for redistribution.
Finally, another concern of the analysis presented so far could be the distance between 
LAPOP years and census years. For that reason, in Table C2 we present estimates considering, 
for each country, LAPOP waves carried out no more than four years after the census year. 
The motivation for this robustness check is that, probably perception of individuals is mainly 
affected by past immigration and not by future migratory flows.10 Results of Table C2 confirm 
that estimates do not change when considering this restriction.
10 In the case of Colombia and Chile, the last census available and considered were conducted in 2018 
and 2017, respectively, so for these countries we only considered the 2018/2019 LAPOP wave.
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4 Short-term variations in immigrants and attitudes
In this section we move to a fixed effects design that controls for time-invariant unobservables 
at the province level. Since countries typically implement just one census every decade, we rely 
on information from national household surveys in order to compute the share of immigrants 
at the province level for a given year, and then match it to the LAPOP survey corresponding 
to that year (See Data Section and Table B5 for details.). Although using national household 
surveys allows us to have several observations over time, the data on immigration from this 
source is noisier due to the lower number of observations (compared to census) and differences 
in definitions across countries.
Given that we can assemble a panel, we run a fixed-effect model that allows us to take 
a different view of the relationship between immigration and social preferences than the one 
discussed in the previous section. Here, we focus the analysis on the relationship between 
changes in these variable in the short run (around two years).
4.1 Empirical Strategy
The regression model that we estimate in this section is the following:
Ripct = @1Mpct + @2Mpct + XipctO + Zp ct& + ap + ct + ^ipct (3)
where Ripct is individual's i support for reduction in income differences and Mpct and M2ct 
are the immigration share in province p and year t and its quadratic form, respectively. In 
contrast to equation (1) we also include province fixed effects, ap, and standard errors are 
clustered at this level to account for potential serial correlation within provinces. Controls are 
the same as for equation (1).
4.2 Main Results
Table 7 shows estimates of the two-way fixed-effects model for support for reduction in income 
differences. Results show again a clear negative relationship between immigration and prefer- 
ences for redistribution that is stable across specifications. Considering the specification with 
the full set of controls we find that a 1 percentage point increase in the share of immigrants 
for an average province in terms of immigration (a province with 1.25% of immigration in our 
sample) reduces support for redistribution by about 0.029 standard deviations. In addition, the 
level of immigration in which the relation between the share of immigrants and preferences for 
redistribution reaches its minimum is close to 5.7% which is greater than p90 of our sample.
This result is close to the OLS estimates presented in Table 1. However, coefficients are less 
statistically significant, which may be explained by the fact that immigration data coming from 
household surveys are noisier than census information.
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Table 7: Main results: effect of immigration on support for reduction in income differ- 
ences
(I) (II) (III)
Share immigrants -3.147 -3.641* -3.656*
(1.918) (2.089) (2.052)
Share immigrants, squared 27.40 31.45 31.63*
(17.63) (19.19) (18.98)
Observations 71,354 71,354 71,354
Province FE Yes Yes Yes
Country-Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Provincial controls No Yes Yes
Individual controls No No Yes
*** Significance at 1% level; ** significance at 5% level; *significance at 
10% level.
Notes: Dependent variable measures support for reduction in income dif­
ferences and is based on the agreement to the statement: “The (Country) 
government should implement strong policies to reduce income inequality 
between the rich and the poor”. It is standardized (z-score). Provincial 
controls include log native population, whether the city is small, medium 
or large, unemployment rate, mean of household per capita income and 
Gini coefficient; individual controls include years of education, age, sex, 
agexsex, years of educationxsex, marital status, self-reported race, rural 
respondent, activity status (employee, unemployed, student, retired), a 
dummy whether the individual lived an insecurity episode in the last 12 
months, income scale and a subjective income mobility scale respect to 
the last 12 months. Clustered standard errors at the the provincial level 
in parenthesis.
4.3 Heterogeneous Effects
We also explore heterogeneous effects and find results that are consistent with those discussed 
in the cross-country analysis with census data. In particular, the anti-redistribution effect is 
stronger for high income respondents (Table C12). On the other hand, although not statistically 
significant, differences in response to immigration between high- and low-skilled individuals go 
in the same direction as before (Table C11). Finally, estimates appears to be significantly driven 
by individuals self-selected ideologically as non-leftist (Table C10).
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5 Not-so-brother countries: The case ofVenezuelan forced
migration in Colombia
In this section we study a recent and significant case of massive intra-regional immigration in 
Latin America: the Venezuelan exodus, and its impact on preferences for redistribution. The 
Venezuelan migratory exodus due to the current political instability and the strong economic 
crisis in the country is a well-known phenomenon. According to UNHCR (2019), massive out- 
flow of Venezuelan to different countries around the world is the second most important episode 
of forced displacement after Syria's episode. At the end of 2019, about 3.6 million Venezuelans 
displaced abroad their country fleeing from the economic and social crisis. Due to its geograph- 
ical proximity, Colombia was the first-destination country of Venezuelan refugees hosting about 
1.8 million Venezuelans.
There are few papers that study the effect of this massive inflow of migrants from Venezuela 
in Colombia. The results so far suggest a significant impact on the labor market, crime, political 
attitudes and demographic composition in Colombia (See, for example, Caruso, Canon, and 
Mueller, 2019; Penaloza Pacheco, 2019; Rozo and Vargas, 2019; Knight and Tribin, 2020). In 
this section we study whether this flow of migration has also affected support for redistribution 
in Colombia.
5.1 Data
We use the immigration data at the departmental level of the Great Integrated Household Survey 
(GEIH for its acronym in Spanish) which is the Colombian national household survey carried 
out by the National Statistics Office (DANE). This information is available since 2013.11 To 
measure preferences for redistribution we continue using LAPOP surveys. Given immigration 
data availability, we use four years: 2013, 2014, 2016 and 2018.12 Finally, we also use 1990 
Venezuelan census data from IPUMS International to build our instrument (developed below).
11 Departments are the same unit we were calling provinces. Although the migration module of 
DANE household survey is available since 2012, the question about the country of origin of immigrants 
was included since April 2013.
12 Three departments included in the GEIH are not surveyed by LAPOP: Choco, La Guajira and 
Quindío.
5.2 Descriptive Statistics ofVenezuelan refugees in Colombia
As we can see in Figure 3, the number of Venezuelans living in Colombia has increased contin- 
uously in the period 2013-2019.
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Figure 3: Venezuelans in Colombia. 2013-2019
Notes. Source: Own elaboration based on data from DANE.
However, this massive influx of Venezuelan immigrants into Colombia has not been homo- 
geneous across departments. Figure 4 shows the percentage of Venezuelans in relation to native 
population in 2013 and in 2019. We find that the location of Venezuelans in Colombia has been 
concentrated in border departments possibly because their proximity to Venezuelans' states. In 
the most affected department the percentage is higher than 10% in 2019.
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(a) 2013
Figure 4: Venezuelan Immigration by Department (% Population)
(b) 2019
Notes. Source: Own elaboration based on data from DANE. We consider as Venezuelan immigrants those 
individuals who were born in Venezuela. Departments with no data in the figures are mainly departments in the 
Amazon region with a low population density and small main cities in which data is not available. According 
to the last available census in Colombia (2018), population in these departments represents less than 3% of the 
total population in Colombia.
We exploit this heterogeneous distribution of Venezuelan across department and its evolution 
over time to analyze the effect of this episode of immigration on population preferences for 
redistribution.
Furthermore, characteristics of Venezuelan migrants can be relevant for understanding how 
they may affect residents' preferences. Although historically there has been a significant sim- 
ilarity between Colombian and Venezuelan population, we can expect certain selection in the 
Venezuelans who decided to leave their country and therefore, a significant difference between 
the average Venezuelan that arrives to Colombia and the average Colombian native.
Table 8 shows descriptive statistics on individual socio-demographic and labor market vari­
ables between Venezuelan migrants and natives. We find that, on average, individuals arriving 
from Venezuela are significantly younger than Colombian population, which may be explained 
by the fact that people who decides to migrate are especially individuals on working age. More- 
over, Venezuelan migrants are clearly more vulnerable than the average Colombian: they have 
household per capita income 72% lower and a significantly higher poverty and unemployment 
rates. Altogether, this may be reflecting the difficulty of Venezuelan migrants to achieve accept- 
able living conditions in a new country and the incapacity of the Colombian economy to absorb 
all the increase in the labor supply.
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Table 8: Descriptive statistics of Venezuelan migrants in Colombia - 2019
Venezuelan Colombian Difference P-Value Observations
Male 0.501 0.493 -0.008 0.212 754270
Age 22.33 32.55 10.22 0.000 754270
Years of education 7.778 7.714 -0.064 0.741 723811
Unemployment 0.149 0.103 -0.046 0.000 381613
Labor force participation 0.627 0.564 -0.063 0.000 623650
Household per capita income (logs) 12.40 12.94 0.540 0.000 754270
Poverty rate 0.424 0.215 -0.209 0.000 754270
Notes. Source: Own elaboration based on data from DANE. P-values are for difference between Venezuelan and Colombian 
averages with clustered standard errors at the departmental level.
Clearly, this massive immigration could have impacted on the support for redistribution 
policies in most affected departments. In fact, Figure 5 shows that from 2013 to 2018 the average 
departmental share of Venezuelan immigrants in Colombia has increased from 0.2% to about 2%, 
which represents an increase of almost ten times in only 5 years. On the other hand, support for 
redistribution among resident population seems to have decreased significantly in those years: 
whereas in 2013 approximately 70% of Colombians strongly agreed with the implementation of 
public policies to reduce inequality, five years later this fraction was reduced to around 55%.
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♦2013
♦2014
♦2016
♦2018
Figure 5: Preferences for Redistribution in Colombia and Venezuelan Immigration. 
2013-2018
Source: Own elaboration based on data from DANE and LAPOP. Notes. Strong preferences for redistri­
bution defined as values of 6-7 on the seven-point scale on agreement to the statement: “The (Country) 
government should implement strong policies to reduce income inequality between the rich and the poor” 
Each point is the average support for redistribution and Venezuelan immigration in the country.
It is worth mentioning that although Figure 5 shows a negative relationship between the 
share of Venezuelan immigrants and preferences for redistribution, it has a decreasing rate. This 
is consistent with the quadratic specification proposed by Alesina, Murard, and Rapoport (2019) 
and implemented in this paper.
In the following subsection we introduce the econometric specification and the empirical 
strategy to estimate the causal effect of this massive inflow of Venezuelans migrants on the 
support for redistribution.
5.3 Empirical Strategy
In order to analyze the effect on preferences for redistribution in Colombia of Venezuelan forced 
migration, we estimate the following equation:
Ridrt = filMdrt + ^2Mdrí + Xidrt ® + Zdrt& + ad + ^rt + Cdrt
where Ridrt is individual's i living in department d and region r support for reduction in 
income differences in year t; Mdrt and Mjrt are the Venezuelan immigration share in department 
d and its quadratic form; Xidrt is a vector of individual controls (years of education, age, sex, 
race, marital status, employment activity status, urban status, income scales, subjective income 
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mobility and self-reported insecurity episode suffering) and Zdrt a vector of departmental con­
trols obtained from DANE (log of native population, unemployment rate, GDP, Gini coefficient, 
share of non-Venezuelan immigrants, poverty rate and share of rural population); ad and Xrt 
are department and region-year fixed effects, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the 
department level to account for potential serial correlation within departments.
Considering that the allocation of Venezuelan immigrants was not random, we use an instru­
mental variable approach to instrument the share of Venezuelan immigrants in each Colombian 
department. We use a well-known enclave instrument used in several papers analyzing episodes 
of forced migration, including the Venezuelan (see, for instance, Del Carpio and Wagner, 2015; 
Morales, 2018; Caruso, Canon, and Mueller, 2019). It exploits the fact that given the forced 
nature of the migration, the location of Venezuelan migrants was specially concentrated on 
departments near to the Colombian border with Venezuela. Formally:
IVdrt = Vt £ (4)
where Vt is the stock of Venezuelan immigrants living in department d region r in year t; 
aSj1990 is the share of Venezuelan living in Venezuelan State s according to 1990 Venezuelan 
census and Kdrs is the driving-distance in kilometers between Colombian department d and 
Venezuelan State s.13 The intuition of the instrument is that those Colombian departments 
located near to the border with Venezuela and, specifically, near to Venezuelan States with 
an historical high population density, are expected to face a higher immigration than those 
departments located far away from the borders.
13 Driving-distance is estimated by implementing Stata command georoute of Weber and Martin 
(2018) which also provides information about the travel-time between Colombian departments and 
Venezuelan States. Results are robust when travel time is considered instead of driving-distance in the 
instrument calculation.
14 In other words, if an individual native to Venezuela knows a Colombian person, it is more likely 
that this Venezuelan person has a network of contacts in Colombia that can help her in case she decides 
to leave the country and, at the same time, this is more likely to happen in those Venezuelan States 
with a higher share of Colombian population.
As a robustness exercise we estimate the same IV regressions but slightly changing the 
instrument. Instead of considering the element aSj1990 that represents the share of Venezuelans 
in each Venezuelan state we consider the element 0Sj199O that represents the share of Colombians 
in each Venezuelan state s in relation to the total number of Colombians in Venezuela according 
to the 1990 census. This last instrument relies on the idea that Colombians departments that 
are close to Venezuelan states with a greater proportion of Colombian population in the past 
are more likely to receive a greater number of Venezuelans due to networks.14
5.4 Main Results of Venezuelan Immigration on Attitudes
Table 9 shows the main results for the case of Colombia. We present both the OLS and IV 
estimates with controls added sequentially. We find that there is a stable negative non-monotonic 
relationship across specifications between Venezuelan immigration and support for the reduction 
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in income differences. Although coefficients are quite large, they are statistically significant at 
the 1% level once we account for individual and departmental differences in the IV estimator.15
First Stage of IV estimation for aggregate results are presented in Table D5 of Appendix D.
In our preferred specification in column (VI) of Table 9, we estimate that a 1 pp increase 
in the share of Venezuelan immigrants in a Colombian department with an average share of 
Venezuelan immigrants (0.07% in our sample) reduces preferences for redistribution in 0.22 
standard deviations. At the same time, if we consider a one standard deviation increase in the 
share of immigrants (0.01) we obtain a decrease by 20% of the standard deviations of preferences. 
This result is stronger compared to the one found for Latin America as a whole in the previous 
sections. It is worth noticing that the minimum of the relationship between preferences for 
redistribution and Venezuelan immigration is close to 4.6% which is certainly close to the p95 
of Venezuelan share of immigrants distribution.
This result is larger than in the general Latin American case. This difference may be 
accounted for by the fact that the Venezuelan case was an unprecedented episode of massive 
inflow of immigrants in a very short period of time that could abruptly affect the preferences of 
individuals in the receiving country. On the other hand, given the proximity we can expect that 
a higher share of vulnerable people decided to migrate to Colombia rather to farther countries. 
As we saw in Table 8, these differences can determine a stronger reaction in attitudes.
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Table 9: Venezuelan Immigration and Preferences for Redistribution in Colombia
OLS IV
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Share immigrants 0.948 -4.480 -4.389 -13.82 -22.27** -22.88**
(10.86) (11.54) (11.33) (11.48) (10.47) (10.31)
Share immigrants, squared 1.052 56.78 52.26 143.3 242.3** 247.2**
(111.7) (117.4) (116.5) (112.2) (94.24) (93.04)
Observations 4,717 4,717 4,717 4,717 4,717 4,717
F-stat (Kleibergen-Paap Wald) 19.11 122.7 126.1
Department FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region x Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Provincial controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Individual controls No No Yes No No Yes
*** Significance at 1% level; ** significance at 5% level; *significance at 10% level.
Notes: Dependent variable measures support for reduction in income differences and is based on the agreement to the 
statement: “The Colombian government should implement strong policies to reduce income inequality between the 
rich and the poor”. It is standardized (z-score). Departmental controls include log native population, unemployment 
rate, departmental GDP, share of skilled population, inactivity rate, share of migration different than Venezuelan, 
share of independent workers, poverty rate and Gini coefficient; individual controls include years of education, age, 
sex, agexsex, years of educationxsex, marital status, self-reported race, rural respondent, activity status (employee, 
unemployed, student, retired), a dummmy whether the individual lived an insecurity episode in the last 12 months, 
income scale and a subjective income mobility scale respect to the last 12 months. Clustered standard errors at the 
the department level in parenthesis.
5.5 Heterogeneous Effects and Robustness Exercise
In Tables D1, D2 and D3 of Appendix D we analyze heterogeneous effects considering the 
characteristics of individuals such as income, education and ideology. In this case, we are not 
able to distinguish significant differences among the different group of individuals.16 This may 
be explained by the fact that massive inflow of Venezuelan in Colombia was an unexpected 
shock in the short-term that could probably have affected average individual's preferences in 
the same magnitude.
16 First Stage of IV estimations for heterogeneous effects are presented in Tables D6, D8, D7 of 
Appendix D.
Finally, Table D4 in Appendix D shows the aggregate results and heterogeneous effects 
presented in this section but using the instrument that considers the share of Colombians in 
each Venezuelan State in the past (0Sj199o) rather than the share of Venezuelans in each State 
(aSj199o). As can be seen, the results do not change when this instrument is considered.
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6 Concluding Remarks
Immigration seems to have affected natives' preferences and attitudes in Europe and the United 
States. In this paper we study whether this result also holds in a context of developing countries 
where migration is essentially intra-regional.
We use three different settings. First, we exploit within-country variation in twelve Latin 
American countries. We find a negative and significant relationship between the share of im- 
migrants in a province and the support for redistributive policies in the resident population. 
The results are basically driven by intra-regional immigration, that is, immigration from other 
Latin American countries. Even when migration occurs among rather similar countries, we find 
that the size of the estimated effects are slightly larger than those found by (Alesina, Murard, 
and Rapoport, 2019) for the case of Europe, where immigration is more asymmetric. We also 
find that the anti-redistribution effect is larger among high-skilled and high-income individuals. 
We confirm these results in a different framework: a fixed-effect model that exploits panel data 
from a large database of national household surveys.
Finally, we study the case of mass migration of Venezuelans refugees to Colombia. We find 
that immigration from Venezuela significantly reduces support for strong redistribution policies 
in Colombia. Probably the fact that this wave of migration was massive and in a very short 
period of time (a “shock”) implied results that are significantly higher than the ones in the 
cross-country analysis for Latin America.
Given the relatively similar cultural backgrounds between immigrants and local population 
in the case of Latin America's immigration, a lower or null effect on attitudinal responses could 
have been expected. However, Latin American brotherhood seems to have limits in the extension 
of bonds of solidarity.
Our results are particularly relevant given that Latin America is one of the most unequal 
regions in the world where inequality has also stagnated in recent years (Gasparini, Cruces, 
and Tornarolli, 2016). In this context, the consequences of immigration on current and future 
welfare system can be worrying.
Future research is needed to explore in greater depth the mechanisms behind this anti- 
redistribution effect.
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Appendices
A Appendix
Figure A1: Preferences for Redistribution in Latin America
Notes: The figure shows the percentage of individuals that show significant support for policies to 
reduce income inequality (values of 6-7 on the seven-point scale on agreement to the statement: “The 
(Country) government should implement strong policies to reduce income inequality between the rich 
and the poor”) by LAPOP wave. Countries included are LAPOP Latin American countries.
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B Appendix: Data
Descriptive Statistics
Table B1 presents information concerning support for redistribution measure in Latin American 
countries. As previously mentioned, this variable is related to preferences regarding government 
intervention in the reduction of inequality according to the information provided by LAPOP for 
the period 2008-2018. As can be seen, given that the scale for all questions ranges from 1 to 7, 
there are high levels of support for redistribution in the analyzed countries. This support seems 
to be greater in the case of Argentina, Chile and Dominican Republic while, on the other hand, 
Peru, Guatemala and Ecuador show the lowest value of support for an active attitude on the 
part of governments to reduce income differences.
Table B1: Descriptive Statistics: Preferences for Redistribution in Latin America 2008­
2018
Notes. The dependent variable measures support for reduction in 
income differences and is based on the agreement to the statement: 
“The (Country) government should implement strong policies to 
reduce income inequality between the rich and the poor” where the 
answer is a scale from 1 to 7, such that 1 represents Strongly Disagree 
and 7 is Strongly Agree.
Country Mean SD p25 p50 p75
Argentina 5.84 1.56 5 7 7
Brazil 5.75 1.63 5 6 7
Chile 5.99 1.35 5 7 7
Colombia 5.76 1.54 5 6 7
Costa Rica 5.83 1.62 5 7 7
Dominican Republic 5.92 1.57 5 7 7
Ecuador 5.47 1.65 4 6 7
Guatemala 5.27 1.76 4 6 7
Mexico 5.66 1.62 5 6 7
Panama 5.51 1.73 4 6 7
Peru 5.42 1.56 4 6 7
Uruguay 5.81 1.60 5 7 7
Total 5.68 1.62 5 6 7
Table B2 presents some descriptive statistics of individuals in the sample. There are no 
large differences between countries regarding sex, age and years of education. Moreover, most 
respondents are employed and students are generally less than 10%. Finally, according to the 
last column of the table, on average, individuals from all countries are located to the right of the 
center of the ideological scale, with the exception of Uruguay, where respondents are located,
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on average, slightly to the left of the center of the scale.
Table B2: Descriptive Statistics: Main variables LAPOP 2008-2018
Notes. Own elaboration based on data from LAPOP 2008-2018. Ideological position is a variable in which the 
respondents had to place themselves in a scale from 1 to 10 where 1 is left and 10 is right ideology.
Country Male Age Years of Education Employee Student Ideology
Argentina 0.50 40.2 10.7 0.58 0.08 5.43
Brasil 0.49 38.8 8.51 0.41 0.06 5.59
Chile 0.42 44.8 10.7 0.48 0.06 5.17
Colombia 0.51 37.6 9.72 0.54 0.07 5.91
Costa Rica 0.50 41.2 8.83 0.46 0.09 5.69
Dominican Republic 0.51 39.7 9.36 0.48 0.07 6.08
Ecuador 0.50 38.5 10.8 0.53 0.09 5.33
Guatemala 0.52 38.2 7.46 0.53 0.05 5.35
Mexico 0.52 39.8 9.31 0.52 0.06 5.52
Panama 0.50 38.6 10.8 0.41 0.08 5.53
Peru 0.52 38.8 11.3 0.54 0.08 5.48
Uruguay 0.48 45.7 9.62 0.54 0.04 4.96
Total 0.50 40.1 9.79 0.50 0.07 5.50
Table B3 shows that there is a great variation on the population share of immigrants across 
the analyzed countries. While in Argentina, Costa Rica, Chile, Dominican Republic and Panama 
there is a high share of immigrants, in Brazil, Guatemala, Mexico and Peru it is close to 
zero. Additionally, it is worth noticing that the variability of the shares of immigrants is not 
homogeneous across countries. The largest variability occurs in Argentina, and Chile (standard 
deviation greater than three). Since these countries have also a high immigration share, it is 
reasonable to think that it is concentrated in some country provinces.
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Table B3: Descriptive Statistics: Immigration in Latin America
Notes. Table shows summary statistics of immigration shares at the 
province level for the last available census for each country (See Table B4).
Country Mean SD p25 p50 p75
Argentina 0.031 0.036 0.007 0.012 0.060
Brazil 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.003
Chile 0.040 0.041 0.013 0.021 0.071
Colombia 0.014 0.012 0.004 0.010 0.020
Costa Rica 0.083 0.025 0.054 0.088 0.106
Dominican Republic 0.040 0.024 0.025 0.031 0.047
Ecuador 0.012 0.009 0.005 0.011 0.016
Guatemala 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.006
Mexico 0.010 0.008 0.006 0.008 0.012
Panama 0.029 0.021 0.012 0.019 0.047
Peru 0.004 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.005
Uruguay 0.015 0.009 0.008 0.013 0.020
Total 0.018 0.025 0.003 0.008 0.020
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Immigration Data Sources
Table B4: Census Immigration Data
Country Present immigrants Past immigrants LAPOP Year
Argentina 2010 1991 2008-2018
Brazil 2010 1991 2008-2018
Chile 2017 1992 2008-2018
Colombia 2018 1993 2008-2018
Costa Rica 2011 2000 2008-2018
Dominican Republic 2010 1981 2008-2018
Ecuador 2010 1962 2008-2018
Guatemala 2018 1994 2008-2018
Mexico 2010 2000 2008-2018
Panama 2010 2000 2008-2018
Peru 2017 1993 2008-2018
Uruguay 2011 1985 2008-2018
Notes. Source is IPUMS International for both present and past immigrants with the exception 
of Colombia, Guatemala and Peru which de last census retrieved from the official site.
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Table B5: Household Survey Immigration data
Notes. Own elaboration based on data available from SEDLAC. The information of Bolivia for the years 2012, 2014, 2016 and 2018 was obtained 
from the official site of the Bolivian National Institute of Statistics (INE).
Country Year LAPOP Year Household Survey Country Year LAPOP Year Household Survey
Argentina 2008 2008 Ecuador 2008 2008
2010 2010 2010 2010
2012 2012 2012 2012
2014 2014 2014 2014
2016 2016 2016 2016
2019 2018 2019 2018
Bolivia 2008 2008 Honduras 2008 2008
2010 2011 2010 2010
2012 2012 2012 2012
2014 2014 2014 2014
2017 2016 2016 2016
2018 2018 2018 2018
Brazil 2008 2009 Panama 2008 2008
2010 2011 2010 2010
2012 2012 2012 2012
2014 2014 2014 2014
2017 2015 2017 2017
2018 2018
Chile 2008 2009 Peru 2008 2008
2010 2011 2010 2010
2012 2013 2012 2012
2014 2015 2014 2014
2017 2017 2016 2016
2019 2017
Colombia 2012 2012
2014 2014 Uruguay 2008 2008
2016 2016 2010 2010
2018 2018 2012 2012
2014 2014
Dominican Republic 2008 2008 2017 2017
2010 2010 2019 2018
2012 2012
2014 2014
2016 2016
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Figure B1: Correlation between Immigration Data Sources
Notes: The figure shows the binscatter derived form a regression of the share of immigrants from census 
data to the household surveys' shares (both at the province level) including country fixed effects. The 
sample includes countries for which there is an available household survey in the census year (Argentina, 
Brazil, Costa Rica and Dominican Republic).
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C Tables Latin America analysis
Table C1: Robustness: Excluding capitals
OLS IV
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Share immigrants -1.236 -1.630 -1.791 -6.552** -6.984** -7.608***
(1.356) (1.419) (1.413) (2.734) (2.890) (2.911)
Share immigrants, squared 8.501 10.99 11.36 61.48** 64.85** 68.34**
(11.95) (12.39) (12.27) (26.44) (27.79) (27.90)
Observations 57,802 57,802 57,802 57,802 57,802 57,802
F-stat (Kleibergen-Paap Wald) 12.21 12.51 12.57
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Provincial controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Individual controls No No Yes No No Yes
*** Significance at 1% level; ** significance at 5% level; *significance  at 10% level.
Notes: Dependent variable measures support for reduction in income differences and is based on the agreement to 
the statement: ”The (Country) government should implement strong policies to reduce income inequality between the 
rich and the poor”. It is standardized (z-score). Provincial controls include log native population, whether the city 
is small, medium or large, unemployment rate, provincial mean of household per capita income and Gini coefficient; 
individual controls include skill-level, age, sex, agexsex, years of education x sex, self-reported race, activity status 
(employee, unemployed, student, etc.), a question that captures whether the person lived an insecurity episode in the 
last 12 months, marital status, income scale and a question that asked about how well a person is doing economically 
compared to twelve months ago. Immigration data comes from IPUMS, provincial controls come from SEDLAC-World 
Bank and attitudinal information comes from LAPOP. Clustered standard errors at the the province-year level in 
parenthesis.
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Table C2: Robustness: Closer Census
OLS IV
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Share immigrants -6.324* -6.519* -6.315* -12.51* -14.75* -15.22*
(3.511) (3.903) (3.705) (6.417) (8.142) (8.094)
Share immigrants, squared 49.25** 51.09* 49.86** 114.9** 138.8* 141.7*
(23.92) (26.08) (24.83) (57.66) (72.57) (72.20)
Observations 33,289 33,289 33,289 33,289 33,289 33,289
F-stat (Kleibergen-Paap Wald) 5.289 4.646 4.689
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Provincial controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Individual controls No No Yes No No Yes
*** Significance at 1% level; ** significance at 5% level; *significance at 10% level.
Notes: Dependent variable measures support for reduction in income differences and is based on the agreement to 
the statement: ”The (Country) government should implement strong policies to reduce income inequality between 
the rich and the poor”. It is standardized (z-score). Provincial controls include log native population, whether 
the city is small, medium or large, unemployment rate, provincial mean of household per capita income and 
Gini coefficient; individual controls include skill-level, age, sex, agexsex, years of education x sex, self-reported 
race, activity status (employee, unemployed, student, etc.), a question that captures whether the person lived an 
insecurity episode in the last 12 months, marital status, income scale and a question that asked about how well a 
person is doing economically compared to twelve months ago. Immigration data comes from IPUMS, provincial 
controls come from SEDLAC-World Bank and attitudinal information comes from LAPOP. Clustered standard 
errors at the the province-year level in parenthesis.
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Table C3: Robustness: Including ideology control
Total Income Education No Capital
High-Social
Spending Country
Origin
Share immigrants -8.454** -7.624** -8.200** -8.283*** -3.483
(3.543) (3.484) (3.492) (3.028) (2.506)
Share immigrants x High-Income -0.706*
(0.364)
Share immigrants x High-Skilled -0.428
(0.386)
Share immigrants x High Social Spending -3.363*
(1.751)
Share immigrants, squared 68.75** 68.53** 68.51** 73.58** 47.18**
(30.98) (30.91) (30.85) (29.10) (22.97)
Share immigrants (LAC) -8.475**
(3.434)
Share immigrants (no LAC) -2.924
(7.259)
Share immigrants (LAC), squared 78.97**
(34.55)
Share immigrants (no LAC), squared 67.03
(207.2)
Observations 73,748 73,748 73,748 49,893 73,748 73,748
F-stat (Kleibergen-Paap Wald) 11.17 7.474 7.544 13.19 27.94 5.444
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Provincial controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ideology controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
*** Significance at 1% level; ** significance at 5% level; *significance at 10% level.
Notes: Dependent variable measures support for reduction in income differences and is based on the agreement to the statement: ”The (Country) 
government should implement strong policies to reduce income inequality between the rich and the poor”. It is standardized (z-score). Provincial 
controls include log native population, whether the city is small, medium or large, unemployment rate, provincial mean of household per capita income 
and Gini coefficient; individual controls include skill-level, age, sex, agexsex, years of educationxsex, self-reported race, activity status (employee, 
unemployed, student, etc.), a question that captures whether the person lived an insecurity episode in the last 12 months, marital status, income 
scale and a question that asked about how well a person is doing economically compared to twelve months ago. Immigration data comes from IPUMS, 
provincial controls come from SEDLAC-World Bank and attitudinal information comes from LAPOP. Clustered standard errors at the the province-year 
level in parenthesis.
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Table C4: First Stage - Total
Share Share (squared) Share Share (squared) Share Share (squared)
IV 1.009*** 0.0791*** 0.906*** 0.0734*** 0.902*** 0.0733***
(0.0853) (0.0105) (0.0921) (0.0113) (0.0935) (0.0115)
IV (squared) -3.361*** -0.175*** -2.832*** -0.149** -2.813*** -0.149**
(0.459) (0.0609) (0.496) (0.0657) (0.504) (0.0666)
Observations 85,088 85,088 85,088 85,088 85,088 85,088
F-stat (Sanderson-Windmeijer) 35.91 29.93 25.25 29.36 25.01 28.93
Department FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region x Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Provincial controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual controls No No No No Yes Yes
*** Significance at 1% level; ** significance at 5% level; *significance at 10% level.
Notes: Provincial controls include log native population, whether the city is small, medium or large, unemployment rate, provincial mean of household 
per capita income and Gini coefficient; individual controls include skill-level, age, sex, agexsex, years of educationxsex, self-reported race, activity 
status (employee, unemployed, student, etc.), a question that captures whether the person lived an insecurity episode in the last 12 months, marital 
status, income scale and a question that asked about how well a person is doing economically compared to twelve months ago. Immigration data 
comes from IPUMS, provincial controls come from SEDLAC-World Bank and attitudinal information comes from LAPOP. Clustered standard errors 
at the the provincial level in parenthesis.
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Table C5: First Stage - Ideology
Share Share x Non-Leftist Share (squared)
IV 0.888*** 0.162** 0.0732***
(0.0983) (0.0773) (0.0119)
IV x Non-Leftist 0.0211* 0.721*** 0.00249*
(0.0109) (0.0468) (0.00141)
IV (squared) -2.856*** -2.382*** -0.163**
(0.510) (0.430) (0.0660)
Observations 73,748 73,748 73,748
F-stat (Sanderson-Windmeijer) 24.92 71.09 251.3
Department FE Yes Yes Yes
Region x Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Provincial controls Yes Yes Yes
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes
*** Significance at 1% level; ** significance at 5% level; *significance at 10% level.
Notes: Provincial controls include log native population, whether the city is small, medium or large, 
unemployment rate, provincial mean of household per capita income and Gini coefficient; individual 
controls include skill-level, age, sex, agexsex, years of educationxsex, self-reported race, activity status 
(employee, unemployed, student, etc.), a question that captures whether the person lived an insecurity 
episode in the last 12 months, marital status, income scale and a question that asked about how well a 
person is doing economically compared to twelve months ago. Immigration data comes from IPUMS, 
provincial controls come from SEDLAC-World Bank and attitudinal information comes from LAPOP. 
Clustered standard errors at the the provincial level in parenthesis.
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Table C6: First Stage - Education
Share Share x High Skilled Share (squared)
IV 0.874*** 0.0613 0.0698***
(0.0941) (0.0473) (0.0115)
IV x High Skilled 0.0457*** 0.812*** 0.00580***
(0.0115) (0.0374) (0.00166)
IV (squared) -2.789*** -1.349*** -0.146**
(0.501) (0.297) (0.0660)
Observations 85,088 85,088 85,088
F-stat (Sanderson-Windmeijer) 467.5 25.30 33.58
Department FE Yes Yes Yes
Region x Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Provincial controls Yes Yes Yes
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes
*** Significance at 1% level; ** significance at 5% level; *significance at 10% level.
Notes: Provincial controls include log native population, whether the city is small, medium or large, 
unemployment rate, provincial mean of household per capita income and Gini coefficient; individual 
controls include skill-level, age, sex, agexsex, years of educationxsex, self-reported race, activity status 
(employee, unemployed, student, etc.), a question that captures whether the person lived an insecurity 
episode in the last 12 months, marital status, income scale and a question that asked about how well 
a person is doing economically compared to twelve months ago. Immigration data comes from IPUMS, 
provincial controls come from SEDLAC-World Bank and attitudinal information comes from LAPOP. 
Clustered standard errors at the the provincial level in parenthesis.
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Table C7: First Stage - Income
Share Share x High Income Share (squared)
IV 0.840*** -0.0456 0.0647***
(0.0953) (0.0936) (0.0115)
IV x High Income 0.0549*** 0.952*** 0.00767***
(0.00916) (0.0334) (0.00126)
IV (squared) -2.803*** -3.070*** -0.147**
(0.502) (0.541) (0.0663)
Observations 85,088 85,088 85,088
F-stat (Sanderson-Windmeijer) 813.6 123.4 26.21
Department FE Yes Yes Yes
Region x Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Provincial controls Yes Yes Yes
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes
*** Significance at 1% level; ** significance at 5% level; *significance at 10% level.
Notes: Provincial controls include log native population, whether the city is small, medium or large, 
unemployment rate, provincial mean of household per capita income and Gini coefficient; individual 
controls include skill-level, age, sex, age xsex, years of education xsex, self-reported race, activity status 
(employee, unemployed, student, etc.), a question that captures whether the person lived an insecurity 
episode in the last 12 months, marital status, income scale and a question that asked about how well 
a person is doing economically compared to twelve months ago. Immigration data comes from IPUMS, 
provincial controls come from SEDLAC-World Bank and attitudinal information comes from LAPOP. 
Clustered standard errors at the the provincial level in parenthesis.
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Table C8: First Stage - Destination countries
Share Share x Rich Country Share (squared)
IV 0.464*** 0.184*** 0.0117*
(0.0780) (0.0417) (0.00666)
IV x High Social Spending 0.604*** 0.838*** 0.0851***
(0.0523) (0.0449) (0.00660)
IV (squared) -1.592*** -1.090*** 0.0232
(0.417) (0.260) (0.0417)
Observations 85,088 85,088 85,088
F-stat (Sanderson-Windmeijer) 70.89 36.62 131.7
Department FE Yes Yes Yes
Region x Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Provincial controls Yes Yes Yes
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes
*** Significance at 1% level; ** significance at 5% level; *significance at 10% level.
Notes: Provincial controls include log native population, whether the city is small, medium or large, un- 
employment rate, provincial mean of household per capita income and Gini coefficient; individual controls 
include skill-level, age, sex, age x sex, years of education x sex, self-reported race, activity status (employee, 
unemployed, student, etc.), a question that captures whether the person lived an insecurity episode in the 
last 12 months, marital status, income scale and a question that asked about how well a person is doing 
economically compared to twelve months ago. Immigration data comes from IPUMS, provincial controls 
come from SEDLAC-World Bank and attitudinal information comes from LAPOP. Clustered standard 
errors at the the provincial level in parenthesis.
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Table C9: First Stage - Region of Origin
Share - LAC Share - no LAC Share - LAC, (squared) Share - no LAC, (squared)
IV - LAC 1.626*** 0.820*** 0.151*** 0.00690***
(0.303) (0.0670) (0.0336) (0.00232)
IV - no LAC 0.727*** 0.0312*** 0.0466*** 0.00113***
(0.0844) (0.00926) (0.00786) (0.000280)
IV - LAC, (squared) -2.362*** -0.218*** -0.0692 -0.00764***
(0.514) (0.0814) (0.0555) (0.00224)
IV - no LAC, (squared) -31.69*** 0.603 -2.988*** 0.611***
(5.858) (1.318) (0.612) (0.0458)
Observations 85,088 85,088 85,088 85,088
F-stat (Sanderson-Windmeijer) 59.10 1384 1230 82.29
Department FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region x Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Provincial controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
*** Significance at 1% level; ** significance at 5% level; *significance at 10% level.
Notes: Provincial controls include log native population, whether the city is small, medium or large, unemployment rate, provincial mean of 
household per capita income and Gini coefficient; individual controls include skill-level, age, sex, agexsex, years of educationxsex, self-reported 
race, activity status (employee, unemployed, student, etc.), a question that captures whether the person lived an insecurity episode in the last 
12 months, marital status, income scale and a question that asked about how well a person is doing economically compared to twelve months 
ago. Immigration data comes from IPUMS, provincial controls come from SEDLAC-World Bank and attitudinal information comes from LAPOP. 
Clustered standard errors at the the provincial level in parenthesis.
44
Table C10: Short-term variations - Heterogeneous Effects: Ideology
(I) (II) (III)
Share immigrants -1.055 -1.511 -1.661
(2.289) (2.382) (2.338)
Share immigrants x Non-Leftist -3.242** -3.247** -3.130**
(1.620) (1.621) (1.571)
Share immigrants, squared 35.38* 39.73** 39.90**
(18.26) (19.78) (19.53)
Observations 60,840 60,840 60,840
Effect on Non-Leftist -4.2970 -4.7579 -4.7905
P-value [0.0501]* [0.0420]** [0.0372]**
Province FE Yes Yes Yes
Country-Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Provincial controls No Yes Yes
Individual controls No No Yes
*** Significance at 1% level; ** significance at 5% level; *significance at 10% level.
Notes: Dependent variable measures support for reduction in income differences and 
is based on the agreement to the statement: ”The (Country) government should im­
plement strong policies to reduce income inequality between the rich and the poor”. It 
is standardized (z-score). Provincial controls include log native population, whether 
the city is small, medium or large, unemployment rate, provincial mean of household 
per capita income and Gini coefficient; individual controls include skill-level, age, sex, 
agexsex, years of educationxsex, self-reported race, activity status (employee, unem- 
ployed, student, etc.), a question that captures whether the person lived an insecurity 
episode in the last 12 months, marital status, income scale and a question that asked 
about how well a person is doing economically compared to twelve months ago. Im- 
migration data comes from and provincial controls come from SEDLAC-World Bank 
and attitudinal information comes from LAPOP. Clustered standard errors at the the 
provincial level in parenthesis.
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Table C11: Short-term variations - Heterogeneous Effects: Skill level
(I) (II) (III)
Share immigrants -2.759 -3.250 -3.310
(1.907) (2.055) (2.020)
Share immigrants x High-Skilled -0.814 -0.866 -0.735
(0.917) (0.921) (0.856)
Share immigrants, squared 29.31 33.53* 33.26*
(17.93) (19.50) (19.25)
Observations 71,354 71,354 71,354
Effect on High-Skilled -3.5726 -4.1166 -4.0454
P-value [0.0803]* [0.0651]* [0.0652]*
Province FE Yes Yes Yes
Country-Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Provincial controls No Yes Yes
Individual controls No No Yes
*** Significance at 1% level; ** significance at 5% level; *significance at 10% level.
Notes: Dependent variable measures support for reduction in income differences and 
is based on the agreement to the statement: ”The (Country) government should im- 
plement strong policies to reduce income inequality between the rich and the poor”. It 
is standardized (z-score). Provincial controls include log native population, whether 
the city is small, medium or large, unemployment rate, provincial mean of household 
per capita income and Gini coefficient; individual controls include skill-level, age, sex, 
agexsex, years of educationxsex, self-reported race, activity status (employee, unem- 
ployed, student, etc.), a question that captures whether the person lived an insecurity 
episode in the last 12 months, marital status, income scale and a question that asked 
about how well a person is doing economically compared to twelve months ago. Im- 
migration data comes from and provincial controls come from SEDLAC-World Bank 
and attitudinal information comes from LAPOP. Clustered standard errors at the the 
provincial level in parenthesis.
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Table C12: Short-term variations - Heterogeneous Effects: Income level
(I) (II) (III)
Share immigrants -3.021 -3.523* -3.582*
(1.922) (2.092) (2.055)
Share immigrants x High-Income -2.047** -2.083** -1.885**
(0.877) (0.885) (0.863)
Share immigrants, squared 29.25 33.16* 33.45*
(18.18) (19.71) (19.48)
Observations 71,354 71,354 71,354
Effect on High-Income -5.0678 -5.6061 -5.4668
P-value [0.0238]** [0.0199]** [0.0205]**
Province FE Yes Yes Yes
Country-Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Provincial controls No Yes Yes
Individual controls No No Yes
*** Significance at 1% level; ** significance at 5% level; *significance at 10% level.
Notes: Dependent variable measures support for reduction in income differences and is 
based on the agreement to the statement: ”The (Country) government should implement 
strong policies to reduce income inequality between the rich and the poor”. It is stan- 
dardized (z-score). Provincial controls include log native population, whether the city is 
small, medium or large, unemployment rate, provincial mean of household per capita in­
come and Gini coefficient; individual controls include skill-level, age, sex, agexsex, years of 
educationxsex, self-reported race, activity status (employee, unemployed, student, etc.), a 
question that captures whether the person lived an insecurity episode in the last 12 months, 
marital status, income scale and a question that asked about how well a person is doing 
economically compared to twelve months ago. Immigration data comes from and provincial 
controls come from SEDLAC-World Bank and attitudinal information comes from LAPOP. 
Clustered standard errors at the the provincial level in parenthesis.
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D Tables Colombian case
Table D1: Colombia - Heterogeneous effects by income level
OLS IV
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Share immigrants 1.019 -4.409 -4.256 -13.83 -22.29** -22.83**
(10.86) (11.52) (11.32) (11.48) (10.45) (10.30)
Share immigrants x High-Income -0.535 -0.562 -1.208 0.168 0.145 -0.563
(2.741) (2.744) (2.294) (3.546) (3.557) (3.060)
Share immigrants, squared 0.515 56.23 51.43 143.3 242.4** 246.9**
(111.7) (117.2) (116.4) (112.2) (94.02) (92.90)
Observations 4,717 4,717 4,717 4,717 4,717 4,717
F-stat (Kleibergen-Paap Wald) 12.76 82.19 85.51
Department FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region x Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Provincial controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Individual controls No No Yes No No Yes
*** Significance at 1% level; ** significance at 5% level; *significance at 10% level.
Notes: Dependent variable measures support for reduction in income differences and is based on the agreement to the 
statement: ”The Colombian government should implement strong policies to reduce income inequality between the rich 
and the poor”. It is standardized (z-score). Departmental controls include log native population, unemployment rate, 
departmental GDP, share of rural population, share of skilled population, inactivity rate, share of migration different 
than Venezuelan, share of independent workers, poverty rate and Gini coefficient; individual controls include skill-level, 
age, sex, agexsex, years of educationxsex, self-reported race, activity status (employee, unemployed, student, etc.), 
a question that captures whether the person experienced a insecurity episode in the last 12 months, marital status, 
income scale and a question that asked about how well a person is doing economically compared to twelve months 
ago. Immigration data comes from DANE and attitudinal information comes from LAPOP. Clustered standard errors 
at the the department level in parenthesis.
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Table D2: Colombia - Heterogeneous effects by ideology
OLS IV
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Share immigrants 2.679 -2.774 -2.061 -11.55 -19.57* -19.53*
(10.64) (11.36) (11.10) (12.49) (11.23) (11.06)
Share immigrants x Non-Leftist -1.438 -1.153 -1.495 -4.002 -3.860 -4.263
(3.791) (3.733) (3.372) (4.595) (4.537) (4.198)
Share immigrants, squared -2.024 50.97 43.92 158.5 251.1** 253.9**
(112.7) (122.0) (120.2) (113.3) (95.25) (92.70)
Observations 4,575 4,575 4,575 4,575 4,575 4,575
F-stat (Kleibergen-Paap Wald) 12.52 116.9 110.7
Department FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region x Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Provincial controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Individual controls No No Yes No No Yes
*** Significance at 1% level; ** significance at 5% level; *significance at 10% level.
Notes: Dependent variable measures support for reduction in income differences and is based on the agreement 
to the statement: ”The Colombian government should implement strong policies to reduce income inequality 
between the rich and the poor”. It is standardized (z-score). Departmental controls include log native population, 
unemployment rate, departmental GDP, share of rural population, share of skilled population, inactivity rate, share 
of migration different than Venezuelan, share of independent workers, poverty rate and Gini coefficient; individual 
controls include skill-level, age, sex, agexsex, years of educationxsex, self-reported race, activity status (employee, 
unemployed, student, etc.), a question that captures whether the person experienced a insecurity episode in the last 
12 months, marital status, income scale and a question that asked about how well a person is doing economically 
compared to twelve months ago. Immigration data comes from DANE and attitudinal information comes from 
LAPOP. Clustered standard errors at the the department level in parenthesis.
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Table D3: Colombia - Heterogeneous effects by education
OLS IV
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Share immigrants -2.274 -7.206 -4.721 -17.01 -25.43** -23.44**
(10.58) (11.16) (11.22) (10.92) (10.23) (10.38)
Share immigrants x High-Skilled 4.775* 4.515 0.530 6.439* 6.114* 1.029
(2.558) (2.618) (2.041) (3.494) (3.518) (2.741)
Share immigrants, squared -5.365 47.18 51.20 127.2 227.0** 244.9**
(112.8) (119.5) (117.6) (112.1) (94.46) (93.30)
Observations 4,717 4,717 4,717 4,717 4,717 4,717
F-stat (Kleibergen-Paap Wald) 12.94 83.97 92.93
Department FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region x Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Provincial controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Individual controls No No Yes No No Yes
*** Significance at 1% level; ** significance at 5% level; *significance at 10% level.
Notes: Dependent variable measures support for reduction in income differences and is based on the agreement to the 
statement: ”The Colombian government should implement strong policies to reduce income inequality between the 
rich and the poor”. It is standardized (z-score). Departmental controls include log native population, unemployment 
rate, departmental GDP, share of rural population, share of skilled population, inactivity rate, share of migration 
different than Venezuelan, share of independent workers, poverty rate and Gini coefficient; individual controls include 
skill-level, age, sex, agexsex, years of educationxsex, self-reported race, activity status (employee, unemployed, 
student, etc.), a question that captures whether the person experienced a insecurity episode in the last 12 months, 
marital status, income scale and a question that asked about how well a person is doing economically compared to 
twelve months ago. Immigration data comes from DANE and attitudinal information comes from LAPOP. Clustered 
standard errors at the the department level in parenthesis.
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Table D4: Immigration and preferences for redistribution in Colombia - Robustness 
Exercise ***
*** Significance at 1% level; ** significance at 5% level; *significance at 10% level.
Notes: Dependent variable measures support for reduction in income differences and is based on 
the agreement to the statement: ”The Colombian government should implement strong policies 
to reduce income inequality between the rich and the poor”. It is standardized (z-score). Depart- 
mental controls include log native population, unemployment rate, departmental GDP, share of 
rural population, share of skilled population, inactivity rate, share of migration different than 
Venezuelan, share of independent workers, poverty rate and Gini coefficient; individual controls 
include skill-level, age, sex, agex sex, years of educationx sex, self-reported race, activity status 
(employee, unemployed, student, etc.), a question that captures whether the person experienced 
a insecurity episode in the last 12 months, marital status, income scale and a question that asked 
about how well a person is doing economically compared to twelve months ago. Immigration data 
comes from DANE and attitudinal information comes from LAPOP. Clustered standard errors 
at the the department level in parenthesis.
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Share immigrants -25.67** -19.99 -25.56** -25.78**
(12.00) (12.66) (11.94) (11.92)
Share immigrants x Non-Leftist -6.104
(4.578)
Share immigrants x High-Income -0.986
(2.763)
Share immigrants x High-Skilled 0.232
(2.689)
Share immigrants, squared 264.0** 242.8** 263.2** 263.3**
(106.6) (109.4) (106.2) (107.8)
Observations 4,717 4,301 4,717 4,717
F-stat (Kleibergen-Paap Wald) 74.47 49.88 49.78 49.74
Department FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region x Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Provincial controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table D5: First Stage: Total
Share Share (squared) Share Share (squared) Share Share (squared)
IV 0.0247** -0.000344 0.0238*** -0.000335 0.0238*** -0.000335
(0.00973) (0.000685) (0.00563) (0.000524) (0.00565) (0.000526)
IV (squared) -0.000841 0.000234*** -0.000589 0.000242*** -0.000588 0.000242***
(0.000999) (7.05e-05) (0.000582) (5.53e-05) (0.000584) (5.56e-05)
Observations 4,717 4,717 4,717 4,717 4,717 4,717
F-stat (Sanderson-Windmeijer) 81.85 218.6 525.8 403 413.3 534.6
Department FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region x Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Provincial controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual controls No No No No Yes Yes
*** Significance at 1% level; ** significance at 5% level; *significance at 10% level.
Notes: Departmental controls include log native population, unemployment rate, departmental GDP, share of rural population, share of skilled population, 
inactivity rate, share of migration different than Venezuelan, share of independent workers, poverty rate and Gini coefficient; individual controls include 
skill-level, age, sex, agexsex, years of educationxsex, self-reported race, activity status (employee, unemployed, student, etc.), a question that captures 
whether the person experienced a insecurity episode in the last 12 months, marital status, income scale and a question that asked about how well a 
person is doing economically compared to twelve months ago. Immigration data comes from DANE and attitudinal information comes from LAPOP. 
Clustered standard errors at the the department level in parenthesis.
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Table D6: First Stage: Ideology
Share Share x Non-Leftist Share (squared)
IV 0.0233*** 0.00843* -0.000362
(0.00566) (0.00440) (0.000532)
IV x Non-Leftist -0.000148 0.0101*** -1.89e-05*
(0.000117) (0.00124) (1.08e-05)
IV (squared) -0.000520 -0.000121 0.000247***
(0.000583) (0.000470) (5.59e-05)
Observations 4,575 4,575 4,575
F-stat (Sanderson-Windmeijer) 521.1 587.6 177.5
Department FE Yes Yes Yes
Region x Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Provincial controls Yes Yes Yes
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes
*** Significance at 1% level; ** significance at 5% level; *significance at 10% level.
Notes: Departmental controls include log native population, unemployment rate, departmental GDP, 
share of rural population, share of skilled population, inactivity rate, share of migration different than 
Venezuelan, share of independent workers, poverty rate and Gini coefficient; individual controls include 
skill-level, age, sex, agexsex, years of educationxsex, self-reported race, activity status (employee, un- 
employed, student, etc.), a question that captures whether the person experienced a insecurity episode 
in the last 12 months, marital status, income scale and a question that asked about how well a person is 
doing economically compared to twelve months ago. Immigration data comes from DANE and attitudinal 
information comes from LAPOP. Clustered standard errors at the the department level in parenthesis.
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Table D7: First Stage: Income
Share Share x High-Income Share (squared)
IV 0.0238*** 0.000329 -0.000335
(0.00565) (0.000548) (0.000526)
IV x High-Income 6.89e-05 0.0104*** 1.11e-06
(7.89e-05) (0.00129) (6.52e-06)
IV (squared) -0.000587 -1.58e-05 0.000242***
(0.000585) (5.64e-05) (5.56e-05)
Observations 4,717 4,717 4,717
F-stat (Sanderson-Windmeijer) 84.84 429.8 552.9
Department FE Yes Yes Yes
Region x Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Provincial controls Yes Yes Yes
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes
*** Significance at 1% level; ** significance at 5% level; *significance at 10% level.
Notes: Departmental controls include log native population, unemployment rate, departmental GDP, share 
of rural population, share of skilled population, inactivity rate, share of migration different than Venezue­
lan, share of independent workers, poverty rate and Gini coefficient; individual controls include skill-level, 
age, sex, agexsex, years of educationxsex, self-reported race, activity status (employee, unemployed, stu- 
dent, etc.), a question that captures whether the person experienced a insecurity episode in the last 12 
months, marital status, income scale and a question that asked about how well a person is doing econom- 
ically compared to twelve months ago. Immigration data comes from DANE and attitudinal information 
comes from LAPOP. Clustered standard errors at the the department level in parenthesis.
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Table D8: First Stage: Education
Share Share x High-Skilled Share (squared)
IV 0.0238*** 0.00915* -0.000340
(0.00565) (0.00484) (0.000526)
IV x High-Skilled 0.000203** 0.00945*** 1.32e-05
(9.47e-05) (0.000967) (9.08e-06)
IV (squared) -0.000600 -0.000316 0.000242***
(0.000587) (0.000521) (5.59e-05)
Observations 4,717 4,717 4,717
F-stat (Sanderson-Windmeijer) 545 648.5 138.3
Department FE Yes Yes Yes
Region x Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Provincial controls Yes Yes Yes
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes
*** Significance at 1% level; ** significance at 5% level; *significance at 10% level.
Notes: Departmental controls include log native population, unemployment rate, departmental GDP, share 
of rural population, share of skilled population, inactivity rate, share of migration different than Venezue­
lan, share of independent workers, poverty rate and Gini coefficient; individual controls include skill-level, 
age, sex, agexsex, years of educationxsex, self-reported race, activity status (employee, unemployed, stu- 
dent, etc.), a question that captures whether the person experienced a insecurity episode in the last 12 
months, marital status, income scale and a question that asked about how well a person is doing econom- 
ically compared to twelve months ago. Immigration data comes from DANE and attitudinal information 
comes from LAPOP. Clustered standard errors at the the department level in parenthesis.
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